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ABSTRACT
The rise of ad-blockers is viewed as an economic threat by
online publishers, especially those who primarily rely on ad-
vertising to support their services. To address this threat,
publishers have started retaliating by employing ad-block
detectors, which scout for ad-blocker users and react to
them by restricting their content access and pushing them
to whitelist the website or disabling ad-blockers altogether.
The clash between ad-blockers and ad-block detectors has
resulted in a new arms race on the web.
In this paper, we present the first systematic measurement
and analysis of ad-block detection on the web. We have
designed and implemented a machine learning based tech-
nique to automatically detect ad-block detection, and use it
to study the deployment of ad-block detectors on Alexa top-
100K websites. The approach is promising with precision of
94.8% and recall of 93.1%. We characterize the spectrum of
different strategies used by websites for ad-block detection.
We find that most of publishers use fairly simple passive ap-
proaches for ad-block detection. However, we also note that
a few websites use third-party services, e.g. PageFair, for
ad-block detection and response. The third-party services
use active deception and other sophisticated tactics to de-
tect ad-blockers. We also find that the third-party services
can successfully circumvent ad-blockers and display ads on
publisher websites.
1. INTRODUCTION
The online advertising industry has been largely fueling
the World Wide Web for the past many years. According
to the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), the annual on-
line ad revenues for 2014 totaled $49.5 billion in 2014, which
is 15.6% higher than in 2013 [13]. Online advertising plays
a critical role in allowing web content to be offered free of
charge to end-users, with the implicit assumption that end-
users agree to watch ads to support these “free” services.
However, online advertising is not without its problems.
The economic magnetism of online advertising industry has
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made ads an attractive target for various types of abuses,
which are driven by incentives for higher monetary benefits.
Since publishers are paid on a per-impression or per-click
basis, many publishers choose to place ads such that they
interfere with the organic content and cause annoyance to
end-users [21]. They include anything from autoplay video
ads, rollovers, pop-ups, and flash animation ads to the ever-
popular homepage takeover with sidebars that follow user
scrolling. Another major issue with online advertising is the
widespread tracking of users across websites raising privacy
and corporate surveillance concerns. Several recent studies
have shown that ad exchanges aggressively profile users and
invade user privacy [23]. Malvertising (using ads to spread
malware) is also on the rise [26,34].
In addition to the above problems, many users simply de-
sire an ad-free web experience which is much cleaner and
smoother. Therefore, ad-blockers have become popular in
recent years and they can block ads seamlessly without re-
quiring any user input. A wide range of ad-blocking exten-
sions are available for popular web browsers such as Chrome
and Firefox [20]. Adblock Plus is most prominent among all
these extensions [1]. According to a recent academic study,
22% of the most active residential broadband users of a ma-
jor European ISP use Adblock Plus [30]. In addition, it
is estimated in a recent report [32] that $22 billion will be
lost due to ad-blocking in 2015, almost twice the amount
estimated in 2014. To the advertisement industry and con-
tent publishers, ad-blockers are becoming a growing threat
to their business model. To combat this, two strategies have
emerged: (1) companies such as Google and Microsoft have
begun to pay ad-blockers to have their ads whitelisted; and
(2) websites have begun to detect the presence of ad-blockers
and may refuse to serve any user with ad-blocker turned on,
e.g. Yahoo mail reportedly did so recently [18].
As not every website is willing or capable of paying ad-
blockers, the 2nd strategy becomes a low-cost solution that
can be easily deployed. Even though anecdotes exist about
websites starting to detect ad-blockers, the scale at which
this occurs remains largely unknown. To fill this gap, in
this paper we perform the first systematic characterization
of the ad-block detection phenomenon. Specifically, we are
interested in understanding: (1) how many websites are per-
forming ad-block detection; (2) what type of technical ap-
proaches are used; and (3) how can ad-blockers counter or
circumvent such detection.
Key Contributions. The key contributions of the paper
are the following:
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Figure 1: Typical ad-block detection responses
• We conduct a measurement study of Alexa top-100K
websites using a machine learning based approach to identify
the websites that use ad-block detection. The approach is
promising with precision of 94.8% and recall of 93.1%. The
results show that around 300–1100 websites are currently
performing ad-block detection (details in §3).
• We cluster different ad-block detection approaches based
on the JavaScripts that are inserted in the websites. The re-
sults indicate that there is a spectrum of detection solutions
ranging from fairly simple (passive detection) to complex
(active deception). We conduct several case studies to illus-
trate the strengths and limitations of different approaches.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of ad-blockers and
ad-block detectors.
The rise of ad-blockers. The issues with online ads has re-
sulted in a proliferation of ad-blocking software. Ad-blocking
software (or ad-blocker) is an effective tool that blocks ads
seamlessly, primarily published as extensions in web browsers
such as Chrome and Firefox [20]. More recently, Apple has
also allowed content blocking plugins for Safari on iOS de-
vices [25]. Other popular relevant tools include Ghostery [7]
and DisconnectMe [3]; however, they are primarily focused
on protecting user privacy. With respect to functionality,
these ad-blockers (1) block ads on websites and (2) pro-
tect user privacy by filtering network requests that profile
browsing behaviors. Recent reports have shown that the
number of users using ad-blocking software has rapidly in-
creased worldwide. According to PageFair, up to 198 million
users around the world now use ad-blocking software [32].
According a recent academic study, 22% of the most ac-
tive residential broadband users of a major European ISP
use Adblock Plus [30]. These ad-blocking users have been
estimated to cost publishers more than $22 billion in lost
revenue in 2015 [32].
How do ad-blockers work? Ad-blockers eliminate ads
by either page element removal or web request blocking. For
page element removal, ad-blockers use various CSS selectors
to access the elements and remove them. Similarly, for web
requests, ad-blocker looks for particular URLs and remove
the ones which belong to advertisers. For both of these
actions, ad-blockers are dependent on filter lists that con-
tain the set of rules (as regular expressions) specifying the
domains and element selectors to remove. There are vari-
ous kinds of filter lists available which can be included in
ad-blockers. Each of these lists serves a different purpose.
For example, Adblock Plus by default includes EasyList [4],
which provides rules for removing ads from English websites.
Similarly, Fanboy [6] is another popular list that removes
only annoying ads from websites. Additionally, EasyPri-
vacy [5] helps ad-blockers to remove spy-wares.
The rise of ad-block detection. The widespread use of
ad-blockers has prompted a cat-and-mouse game between
publishers and ad-blocking software. More specifically, pub-
lishers have started to detect whether users are visiting their
websites while using ad-blocking software. Once detected,
publishers notify users to turn off their ad-blocking software.
These notifications can range from a mild non-intrusive mes-
sage which is integrated inside website content to more ag-
gressive blocking of website content and/or functionality.
Figure 1 shows examples of both cases. We note that the ag-
gressive approach refrains users from accessing any website
content. To detect the use of ad-blocking software, publish-
ers include scripts in the code of their web pages. When
a user with the ad-blocking software opens such a website,
these scripts typically monitor the visibility of ads on the
page to identify the use of ad-blockers. If ads are found
hidden or removed by the scripts, publishers take counter-
measures according to their policies. It is noteworthy that
the strategies used by publishers to detect ad-blockers is
evolving.
Illustration of ad-block detection. To understand how
ad-block detection scripts operate, let’s analyze the com-
plete cycle of ad-block detection. Figure 2 shows the web
page loading process of http://www.vipleague.tv, which em-
ploys ad-block detection, on a web browser with Adblock
Plus. Figure 3 shows the JavaScript that is used for ad-
block detection by the website.1 The functionality of the
JavaScript can be divided into three parts: timeout, con-
dition check, and response. In Figure 2, we note that the
web browser starts loading the HTML and other page con-
tent included in the HTML code (Ê). While the content is
loading, ad-block extension kicks in and starts evaluating
the HTML code and page content to remove potential ads
(Ë). Since the ad-blocking software starts working after a
small delay, the ad-block detection script has to wait some
time before monitoring the ads. In Figure 3, the timeout
is set at 2000 milliseconds. Once the timeout expires, the
condition check is executed to verify the presence/absence of
ads. This step is typically carried out by accessing various
elements and their css properties. In Figure 3, the script
first checks the visibility property of the div with identifier
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY, as will
be discuss later, this div is specifically designed for ad-block
detection. Ad-blockers sometimes also make the ad invisible
by decreasing its dimensions; therefore, the script verifies the
height and length properties of the ad related div elements
1At the time of writing, this script can detect users with
Adblock Plus.
Figure 2: Web page load evolution for http://www.vipleague.tv. Left: The original website content is loaded.
Middle: Ad-blocker removes ads from the page. Right: Ad-block detector blocks the content and shows a
pop-up notification asking the user to disable ad-blocking software.
1 //step 1: set timeout
2 var myVar = setInterval(function () {
3 myFunc ()
4 }, 2000);
5
6 function myFunc () {
7
8 // step 2: condition check
9 if (window.iExist === undefined ||
10 (!$("#
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY
").is(
11 ":visible") && (($(".vip_052x003").height () <
100 && !$(
12 "#vipchat").length) && $(".vip_09x827").height
() < 25))) {
13
14 //step 3: response
15 $("#
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY
").css(
16 "width :100%; height :100%; position:fixed;z-
index :999999; top:0");
17 $("#
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY
").show();
18 }
19 else if ($("#
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY")
.is(
20 ":visible") && $(".vip_052x003").height () >
249) {
21
22 $("#
XUinXYCfBvqpyDHOrOAVClxoWJemrlPpfYCdWfiyAzNY
").hide()
23 }
24 }
Figure 3: Ad-block detection JavaScript extracted
from http://www.vipleague.tv
for classes vip 052x003 and vip 09x827. If the script detects
that ads were removed or hidden, then the response step is
executed. As discussed earlier, the implementation details of
this step varies across publishers. A few publishers gently re-
quest users to remove/disable their ad-blockers, while others
aggressively show a page-wide notification and/or block con-
tent (Ì). For example, in Figure 3, the publisher responds
by first changing css properties of the div, which it verifies
in a conditional check. More specifically, the publisher sets
the z-index of the div to make it a pop-up message.
3. MEASURING AD-BLOCK DETECTION
In this section, we design and implement our approach
for automatically identifying websites that employ ad-block
detection. The main premise of our approach is that web-
sites conducting ad-block detection make distinct changes
to their web page content for ad-block users as compared
to users without ad-block. Our goal is to identify, quantify,
and extract such distinct features that can be leveraged for
training machine learning models to automatically detect
websites that employ ad-block detection.
3.1 Overview
We want to identify distinct features that capture the
changes made by ad-block detectors to the HTML struc-
ture of web pages. To this end, we first conducted some
pilot studies to test the behavior of websites that employ
ad-block detection. Based on our pilot studies, we found
that the changes made by ad-block detectors can be cate-
gorized into: (1) addition of extra DOM nodes, (2) change
in the style of existing DOM nodes, and (3) changes in the
textual content. We also found a few cases when the web-
sites completely changed the web page content. In addition,
a few websites with ad-block detectors reacted by redirect-
ing users to warning pages. Note that the Adblock Plus
is installed with the default configuration which allows ac-
ceptable ads [11]. This will likely suppress many ad-block
detections and result in underestimating their prevalence.
However, since most regular users would choose the default
configuration, we believe our study represents what most
users would observe regarding to ad-block detection. Below,
we provide an overview of our proposed features and also
discuss how they capture the changes by ad-block detectors.
Node additions. We found that in order to show notifica-
tion to users with ad-blockers, websites dynamically create
and add new DOM nodes. Thus, node additions in the DOM
can potentially indicate ad-block detection. We can log the
total number of DOM elements inserted in a web page.
Style changes. We found that a few websites include ad-
block detection notifications which are in their page content
but hidden. If these websites detect the use of ad-blockers,
they change the visibility of their notification. To cover such
cases, we can log attribute changes to DOM elements of a
web page.
Text changes. Other then structural changes, we found
that some websites change the textual content (i.e., text-
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Figure 4: Overview of our methodology for measur-
ing ad-block detection.
related nodes) in response to ad-blockers. Therefore, we can
log changes in the textual content of a web page and addition
of text-related nodes in a web page.
Miscellaneous features. In addition to the above-mentioned
features, we also consider other features like innerHTML to
detect whether the structure is completely changed and URL
to detect redirection.
3.2 Methodology
Figure 4 provides an overview of our methodology to au-
tomatically measure ad-block detection on the web. We con-
duct A/B testing to compare the contents of a web page with
and without ad-blocking software. To automate this process,
we use the Selenium Web Driver [8] to open two separate in-
stances of the Chrome web browser, with and without Ad-
block Plus (Ê). We implemented a custom Chrome browser
extension to record changes in the content of web pages dur-
ing the page load process. Our extension records the struc-
ture of the DOM tree, all textual content, and HTML code
of the web page (Ë). We implemented a feature extraction
script to process the collected data and generate a feature
vector for each website (Ì). We feed the extracted features
to a supervised classification algorithm for training and test-
ing (Í). We train the machine learning model using a labeled
set of websites with and without ad-block detectors. Below
we describe these steps in detail.
Web automation for A/B testing. Using the Selenium
Web Driver [8], we implemented a web automation tool to
conduct automated measurements. For A/B testing, our
tool first loads a website without Adblock Plus, and then
opens it with Adblock Plus in a separate browser instance.
However, we found that many websites host dynamic con-
tent that changes at a very small timescales. For example,
some websites include dynamic images (e.g., logos), which
can introduce noise in our A/B testing. Similarly, most news
websites update their content frequently which can also add
noise. Thus, we may incorrectly attribute these changes to
the ad-blocker or ad-block detector used by the publisher.
To mitigate the impact of such noise, our tool opens multi-
ple instances of each website in parallel and excludes content
that changes across multiple instances.
Data collection using a custom Chrome extension.
To collect data while a web page is loading, we use DOM
Mutation Observers [9] to track changes in a DOM (e.g.
DOMNodeAdded, DOMAttrModified, etc.). The changes we
track include addition of new DOM nodes or scripts, node
attribute changes like class change or style change, removal
of nodes, changes in text etc. We implemented the data
collection module as a Chrome extension. The extension
is preloaded in the browser instances that are launched by
our web automation tool. As soon as a web page starts
loading, the extension attaches an observer listener with
it. Whenever an event occurs, the listener fires and we
record the information. For example, we record the iden-
tifier, type, value, name, parent nodes, and attributes of the
corresponding node. For each attribute change, in addition
to above-mentioned information, we record the name of at-
tribute which changes like style or class and its old and new
value. We also log page level data such as the complete
DOM tree, innerText, and innerHTML as well.
Feature extraction. We then process the output of data
collector to extract a set of informative features which can
distinguish between changes due to ad-block detection. Re-
call that we load each page multiple times to mitigate noise.
Let A denote the data collected with ad-blocker, and let
B & B’ denote the data collected by loading a web page
twice without an ad-blocker. We provide details of the fea-
ture extraction process below. Table 1 includes the list of
all features used in our study.
• Node features. For each instance, we extract DOM related
nodes because our pilot experiments revealed that websites
using ad-block detection add only DOM related nodes. More
specifically, we extract the list of anchor, div, h1, h2, h3,
img, table, p, and iframe nodes for each instance. Once we
have a list of DOM nodes for each instance, we compare A
vs. B’ and B vs. B’ to obtain the list of differences between
these nodes. We denote these lists as AB’ and BB’ lists. As
explained earlier, to remove number of node differences due
Table 1: Features used to identify ad-block detectors
Feature Set Description
# div
# h1
# h2
# h3
# img
# table
# p
# br
# iframe
Node features
# nodes
display change
visibility change
height change
width change
opacity change
maxheight change
background-size changeAttribute features
total changes in style
lines differences
character differencesText features
bag of words
HTML changesOverall
URL change
to dynamic content of websites, we cross-validate nodes in
AB’ with BB’ using their properties. Our key idea is that
if a publisher ads random nodes to a web page, they may
have different identifiers but most the other properties will
be almost similar. Thus, we remove the nodes from AB’
that also appear in BB’.
• Attribute features. For each instance, we extract changes in
the style of DOM related nodes. More specifically, we focus
on changes to the display-related property of nodes. For
instance, we log whether the visibility property of a node
changes from hidden to non-hidden. We also log changes to
the display property of a node, e.g., the number of changes
in height, width, and opacity of nodes. Similar to node
features, we compare A, B, and B’ to eliminate attribute
changes from AB’ that also appear in BB’.
• Text features. We get the list of all text nodes in A, B and
B’. Using the lists, we identify pairs of nodes with differences
texts. We particularly focus on line differences rather than
character-level differences to mitigate noise (e.g., difference
in clock time). We again compare A, B, and B’ to eliminate
changes in textual features from AB’ that also appear in
BB’.
• Structural features. We compare differences in the over-
all page HTML using the cosine similarity metric. If the
cosine similarity between A and B/B’ is very low, it indi-
cates significant content change. To check for potential URL
redirections, we also track changes in URL.
Table 2: Feature ranking based on information gain
Name Information Gain
# words 35.44%
# text nodes added 27.89%
# lines added 18.13%
# nodes added 17.37%
# characters added 17.19%
# div nodes added 13.01%
# height property changed 10.67%
# display property changed 8.67%
# styles attribute changed 7.20%
# images added 5.82%
Classification model training and testing. We feed the
extracted features to a machine learning classifier to auto-
matically detect websites that employ ad-block detection.
However, in order to train the classification algorithm, we
need a sufficient number of labeled examples of websites that
detect ad-blockers (i.e., positive samples) and websites that
do not detect ad-blockers (i.e., negative samples). To get
positive samples, we first use a crowd-sourced list of such
websites [2]. We manually validated the websites in this
list, and excluded websites that did not detect and respond
to ad-blockers. We also manually opened Alexa top 1000
websites and identified four websites that use ad-block detec-
tion.2 Overall, we identified a total of 200 positive training
samples. Since a vast majority of Alexa top 1000 websites
do not deploy ad-block detection, we use them as negative
training samples.
3.3 Feature Analysis
In this section, we analyze the extracted features to quan-
titatively understand their usefulness in identifying ad-block
detection. We first visualize the distributions of a few fea-
tures. Figure 5 plots the cumulative distribution functions
(CDF) of two features. We observe that websites which em-
ploy ad-block detection tend to changes more lines and add
div elements than other websites. These distributions con-
firm our intuition that ad-block detectors make changes in
the web content that are distinguishable.
To systematically study the usefulness of different fea-
tures, we employ the concept of information gain [28], which
uses entropy to quantify how our knowledge of a feature re-
duces the uncertainty in the class variable. The key bene-
fit of information gain over other correlation-based analysis
methods is that it can capture non-monotone dependencies.
Let H(X) denote the entropy (i.e., uncertainty) of feature
X. H is defined as:
H = −
∑
i
pilog pi
2 During the manual verification, we found that the response
of websites after ad-block detection varies. Most websites
detect and respond to ad-blockers on the homepage without
waiting for any input from users. In contrast, some web-
sites respond to ad-blockers only when a particular content
type is requested (e.g., video is played) or when the user
navigates to other pages. Since it is not practical to auto-
matically identify such requirements, we restrict ourselves
to the former category of websites. Also note that some
websites include ad-block detection logic but they do not
respond to ad-blockers. We excluded these websites from
the list as well.
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Figure 5: Distribution of features used to identify
ad-block detection
Table 3: Effectiveness of different classifiers
Classifier Recall Precision AUC
Random Forest 93.1% 94.8% 96.0%
C4.5 Decision Tree 87.0% 89.0% 91.3%
Naive Bayes 82.0% 82.4% 89.0%
Let H(Y ) denote the entropy (i.e., uncertainty) of the binary
class variable Y . Information gain is computed as:
IG(Y |X) = H(Y )−H(Y |X).
We can normalize information gain, also called relative in-
formation gain, as:
H(Y )−H(Y |X)
H(Y )
.
Using this, we can quantify what an input feature informs us
about the use of ad-block detection. Table 2 ranks the top
10 features based on their information gain. We note that
text-based features (number of words changed and number
of text nodes added) have the highest information gain, both
exceeding 25%. They are followed by node and style based
features (e.g., number of div elements added, number of
nodes for which height property is changed, etc.).
3.4 Classifier Evaluation
We train machine learning classification models using the
labeled set of 1000 negative samples and 200 positives sam-
ples. We use the standard k-fold cross validation methodol-
ogy to verify the accuracy of the trained models. For this
purpose we select k = 5, divide the data into 5 folds where
one fold is used as training set while rest of folds are used
for verification. To quantify the classification accuracy of
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Figure 6: Visualization of decision tree model for
ad-block detection
the trained models, we use the standard ROC metrics such
as precision, recall, and area under ROC curve (AUC).
Precision =
True Positives
True Positives + False Positives
Recall =
True Positives
True Positives + False Negatives
We test multiple machine learning models on our data set.
We tuned various parameters of each of these models to op-
timize their classification performance. Table 3 summarizes
the classification accuracy of these classifiers. We note that
the random forest classifier, which is a combination of tree
classifiers, clearly outperforms the C4.5 decision tree and the
naive Bayes classifiers. The random forest classifier achieves
93.1% recall, 94.8% precision, and 96.0% AUC.
To further evaluate the effectiveness of different feature
sets in identifying ad-block detection, we conduct experi-
ments using stand alone feature sets and then evaluate their
all possible combinations. We divide the features into node
features, attribute features, and text features. Among stand
alone feature sets, text-based features provide the best clas-
sification accuracy. We also observe that using combinations
of feature sets does improve the classification accuracy. The
best classification performance is achieved when all feature
sets are combined.
To further gain some intuition from the trained machine
learning models, we visualize a pruned version of the de-
cision tree model trained on labeled data in Figure 6. As
expected from the information gain analysis, we note that
a text feature (words difference) is the root node of the de-
cision tree. If there is a positive word difference, the model
detects ad-block detection. Similarly, if node visibility is
changed, the model detects ad-block detection. It is inter-
esting to note that the top three features in the decision
tree belong to different feature categories. This indicates
that different feature sets complement each other, rather
than capturing similar information, which we also observed
earlier when evaluating different combinations of features.
4. AD-BLOCK DETECTION IN THE WILD
We want to analyze the strategies and methods used by
publishers for ad-block detection. To this end, we first use
the random forest model on Alexa top 100K websites to iden-
tify ad-block detectors. Our machine learning model found a
total of 292 websites that detect and respond to ad-blockers.
Table ?? (in Appendix) lists these 292 ad-block detecting
websites along with their Alexa rank. We note that a vast
majority of the websites in Table ?? have low Alexa ranks,
likely due to 1) the top web websites have paid ad-blockers
to be whitelisted or 2) the top websites are worried about
losing users if they take an aggressive stance against ad-
blocker users. Using additional string based features (e.g.,
“Adblock”, “Adblock Plus”), we also found a total of 797
websites that have ad-block detection scripts but do not ex-
hibit visible behaviors, likely due to default-on acceptable
ads in our Adblock Plus extension. It is also possible that
such websites are currently tracking the usage of ad-blockers
but not necessarily ready to go aggressively against users.
Overall, we found 1,089 ad-block detecting websites in the
Alexa top-100K list. In this section, we focus our atten-
tion on the ad-block detecting websites that not only detect
ad-blockers but also respond to them.
Our goal here is to characterize how different ad-block
detection strategies operate under the hood. We cluster ad-
block detection strategies based on their JavaScript code
similarity. Our analysis allows us to measure the popular-
ity of specific strategies and third-party ad-block detection
services, e.g. PageFair. The result of the analysis will also
help us design countermeasures against the state-of-the-art
ad-block detectors.
4.1 JavaScript Collection
As a first step, we collect the JavaScript code of all web-
sites that employ ad-block detection. Analyzing the func-
tionality of JavaScript code is non-trivial because the code
can be packed inside functions such as eval. To overcome
these issues, we leverage the fact that the code needs to un-
pack itself before execution. We attach a debugger between
the Chrome V8 JavaScript engine [15] and the web pages.
Specifically, we observe script.parsed function, which is
invoked when eval is called or new code is added with
<iframe> or <script> tags. We implement the debugger
as a Chrome extension and collect all JavaScript snippets
parsed on a web page and identify the snippet responsible
for ad-block detection.
4.2 Clustering
Given these ad-block detector JavaScript snippets, we aim
to cluster them into a few groups to identify their families.
To this end, we first compute“similarity”between JavaScript
snippets and then use clustering.
Methodology. To analyze and quantify the similarity be-
tween JavaScript snippets, we parse them to produce ab-
stract syntax trees (ASTs). ASTs have been used in prior
literature for JavaScript malware detection [19,24]. ASTs al-
low us to retain the structural and logical properties of the
code while ignoring fine details like variable names, which
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Figure 8: Cluster visualization using PCA. The web-
sites in the dense central cluster use simple scripts
for ad-block detection. The outliers represent web-
sites that use more sophisticated third-party scripts
for ad-block detection.
are not useful for our analysis. Figure 7 shows two ad-block
detection JavaScript snippets and their corresponding AST
visualizations. We use the Esprima JavaScript parser [14] to
visualize ASTs for each JavaScript snippet. We note that al-
though the JavaScript snippets look fairly different but their
ASTs have similar logical structure except minor differences
near the leaf nodes.
We transform ASTs of all ad-block detection JavaScript
snippets to normalized node sequences by performing the
pre-order traversal on each tree. Each variable length se-
quence is composed of node types that appear in the tree.
Note that there are 88 distinct node types in the JavaScript
language. To transform the variable length normalized node
sequences to a fixed number of dimensions, we convert each
sequence into a 88-dimensional summary vector. Each JavaScript
snippet is represented as an 88-dimensional point, where
each dimension corresponds to a node type. The value of
each dimension is the node type frequency.
Results. We use the Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
to reduce the dimensionality of the summary vector for vi-
sualization. Figure 8 plots the a 3-dimensional visualization
of 292 ad-block detection JavaScript snippets. We note that
the center of the plot contains a dense cluster of instances.
Other outlier instances are spread out far from the central
cluster. We surmise that the central cluster represents web-
sites that use a similar approach towards ad-block detection.
However, there are a number of outliers that represent cus-
tomized and potentially more sophisticated approaches. In
the next section, we conduct an in-depth analysis of various
ad-block detection approaches.
4.3 Case Studies
Next, we analyze the ad-block detection strategies used
by different clusters. We first study the ad-block detection
strategies of websites in the dense central cluster. We refer
to these websites as the “common family”. We then study
the ad-block detection strategies of outlier websites. Our
manual inspection of outliers revealed that these approaches
use third-party ad-block detection scripts, including Page-
Fair [16], FuckAdBlock [12], and Sourcepoint [17]. Below,
we provide an in-depth analysis of both types of websites.
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1 $(document).ready(function () {
2 setTimeout(function () {
3 if (localStorage.noad === undefined && (16
>= $("#gAds").height () ||
4 16 >= $("#gAd2".height ())) {
5 $("#Blog1").remove ();
6 sweetAlert("Oops.. please don’t block my
ADs",
7 "warning");}
8 }, 3456)
9 });
1 jQuery(document).ready(function () {
2 setTimeout( if (jQuery("#adblock").height () == 0)
{
3 window.location = "/adblock"
4 }, 3456)
Figure 7: Visualization of ASTs of two ad-block detector JavaScript snippets. We note that although the
code snippets appear to be different, the structure of their ASTs are similar.
4.3.1 The Common Family
The most distinct feature of ad-block detection JavaScript
snippets in the common family is their simplicity. Most of
them are between 5-10 lines of code, yet they can successfully
detect state-of-the-art ad-blockers. Specifically, as discussed
in §2, ad-blockers tend to aggressively block ads by removing
the ad frames entirely, without the intention of hiding their
operation whatsoever. The obvious nature of ad-blockers
allows simple scripts, such as those in the common family,
to easily identify ad-block users.
Detection timing. We note that all websites in the com-
mon family launch their ad-block detection logic in the be-
ginning of the page load process. Since it may take a few
seconds before an ad-blocker can remove the ads, some web-
sites delay the execution of their logic by standard setTime-
out() or setTimeIntervel(). In Figure 7, we show two
example ad-block detection scripts, one inserting delay and
another without delay. Since the ad-block detection logic
is a one-time check (i.e., it is not invoked periodically), ad-
block detectors include the delay to ensure that ad-blockers
have ample time conduct their operation.
Detection logic. The ad-block detection JavaScript snip-
pets in the common family typically check different ad ele-
ments to detect ad-blockers. In Figure 9, we show the detec-
tion logic implemented by several websites in the common
family. We again note that the detection checks are fairly in-
tuitive and simple. For example, consider urlchecker.org,
which checks whether the height of adcheker div is less then
10pxs or not. Our further analysis revealed that the ad-
blocker blocks the adsbygoogle.js script due to which the
1 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://
knowlet3389.blogspot.hk/}{ http :// knowlet3389.
blogspot.hk/}
2 if (localStorage.noad === undefined && (16 >= $("#
gAds").height ()
3 || 16 >= $("#gAd2").height ()))
4
5 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://www.
elahmad.com/}{ http ://www.elahmad.com/}
6 if(jQuery("#adblock").height ()==0)
7
8 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://
urlchecker.org/}{ http :// urlchecker.org/}
9 if ($("#adchecker").height () < 10)
10
11 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://www.
hentai.to/}{ http ://www.hentai.to/}
12 if(document.getElementById("tester")!= undefined)
13
14 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http :// forum.
pac -rom.com/}{ http :// forum.pac -rom.com/}
15 if(!ad || ad.innerHTML.length == 0 || ad.
clientHeight === 0)
Figure 9: Examples of detection logic used by dif-
ferent ad-block detectors
adcheker div is empty and its height is equal to 1px. Other
websites in Figure 9 also check the properties of different
div elements. Since the filter lists used by ad-blockers, e.g.,
EasyList [4] and Fanboy [6], are publicly available, ad-block
detectors can successfully setup these detection rules. For
instance, EasyList [4] used by ad-blockers has adsbyggole.js
in its block list.
Response. Although the detection logic used by websites in
the common family is similar, their response to ad-blockers
vary widely. Figure 10 lists a few of the responses. For
hentai.to, a <p> element requests users to disable the ad-
blocker. Since the original content is preserved, this ap-
proach is not aggressive. However, for knowlet3389.blogspot.hk,
the #Blog1 div is removed upon ad-block detection, which
indicates that the website hides its content from ad-block
users. elahmad.com also aggressive responds by redirecting
ad-block users to a warning page. Overall, we find a wide
spectrum of responses to ad-block detection, ranging from
gentle request messages to more aggressive redirection.
4.3.2 PageFair
PageFair is a service that allows publishers to detect ad-
block usage and take mitigation actions such as display tai-
lored non-intrusive ads to ad-block users. In the list of 292
ad-block detection websites, we found 12 websites that use
PageFair. We note that PageFair uses dynamic JavaScript
and code obfuscation. For example, it involves assembling
URLs on the fly to retrieve additional JavaScript codes. Be-
low, we shed light on PageFair’s strategy for ad-block detec-
tion and its response.
Detection timing. PageFair performs multiple periodic
checks at various stages of the web page load process to de-
tect ad-blockers. This approach is much more sophisticated
than the common family and makes it harder for ad-blockers
to evade detection by simply delaying their activity.
Detection logic. PageFair’s detection logic attempts to
actively trap ad-blockers by injecting different“baits”on web
pages. This is in stark contrast to simple passive detectors
used by most websites in the common family. In addition,
1 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://
knowlet3389.blogspot.hk/}{ http :// knowlet3389.
blogspot.hk/}
2 $("#Blog1").remove ();
3 sweetAlert("Oops.. please don’t block my ADs",
4 "warning");
5
6 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://www.
elahmad.com/}{ http ://www.elahmad.com/}
7 window.location="/adblock"
8
9 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://
urlchecker.org/}{ http :// urlchecker.org/}
10 $("#ads_notify").fadeIn ();
11 $("#getlinks").hide();
12 $("#adchecker_btn").fadeIn ();
13
14 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http ://www.
hentai.to/}{ http ://www.hentai.to/}
15 document.write(
16 ’<p class ="no">Please <u>disable </u> your
adblocking
17 software on hentai. TO to keep our community <u>
FREE </u>! ^.^</p>’
18 );
19
20 //\protect\vrule width0pt\protect\href{http :// forum.
pac -rom.com/}{ http :// forum.pac -rom.com/}
21 alert(
22 "We’ve detected an ad blocker running on your
browser ..."
23 );
Figure 10: Examples of responses by different ad-
block detectors.
PageFair attempts to check whether any ad-block plug-in is
installed by looking for various browser resources exposed
by ad-blocking extensions. The use of these methods makes
PageFair’s detection logic difficult to evade. We separately
discuss both of these methods below.
• Baiting: Figure 11 shows different types of baits used by
PageFair. The first example shows an injected div element
that is not visible on the page, i.e. 1x1 in size and negative
values of the top and left properties. The other two exam-
ples show img and script baits. PageFair’s detection logic
injects these baits with keywords such as “ad” in the element
name or URL. For example, the identifier of the div element
is set to influads block. Similarly, the source of script tag is
set to adsense.js, which is a common script used by Google
Ads.
• Extension resources: For Chrome browser, we note that
PageFair attempts to detect the presence of ad-blockers by
accessing extension resources exposed by various ad-blockers
at chrome-extension://. Figure 12 shows how PageFair ac-
cesses extension resources to identify 8 popular ad-blockers
including AdBlock, Adblock Plus, AdBlock Pro, AdBlock
Premium, Adblock Super, Adguard, Ad Remover, and uBlock.
For each type of ad-blocker, it includes a unique extension
identifier, e.g. gighmmpiobklfepjocnamgkkbiglidom for Ad-
Block, and the resource file path. Note that Chrome gener-
ally does not allow web pages to directly access extension re-
sources unless an extension specifies resources as web_accessible_
resources in the manifest file and makes them publicly ac-
cessible. We find that these resources of various ad-blockers
requested by PageFair are indeed publicly accessible. Thus,
ad-blockers are leaking the proof of their presence to ad-
block detectors. In addition, Figure 12 shows that criti-
cal resources such as whitelisted pages are also accessible.
1 //DIV bait
2 var b = document.createElement("DIV");
3 // d = "influads_block"
4 b.id = d;
5 //c=’’
6 b.className = c;
7 //1x1 div
8 b.style.width = "1px";
9 b.style.height = "1px";
10 //div not located in visible frame
11 b.style.top =" -1000px";
12 b.style.left =" -1000px";
13 document.body.appendChild(b);
14 // jquery selector of created div
15 c = jQuery("#" + d);
16 // check if this div is hidden by ad-blocker
17 d = c.is(":hidden") ? 1 : 0;
18 // removing the created div
19 c.remove ();
20
21 //IMG bait
22 f = document.createElement("IMG");
23 //d="06 db9294"
24 f.id = d;
25 f.style.width = "1px";
26 f.style.height = "1px";
27 f.style.top = " -1000px";
28 f.style.left = " -1000px";
29 document.body.appendChild(f);
30 //c="http :// asset.pagefair.com/adimages/textlink -
ads.jpg"
31 f.src = c
32
33 // SCRIPT bait
34 b = document.createElement("SCRIPT");
35 //d="295 f89b1"
36 b.id = d;
37 b.type = "text/javascript";
38 document.getElementsByTagName("head")[0].
appendChild(b);
39 //a= "http :// asset.pagefair.com/adimages/adsense.js
"
40 b.src = a
Figure 11: PageFair uses different baits to detect
ad-blockers.
For example, Adblock Plus exposes block.html, which allows
websites to get a list of blocked URLs.
Response. PageFair provides a whitelist ad service un-
der the acceptable ads manifesto [11]. To understand Page-
Fair’s service, we installed PageFair on a test website that
uses Google Ads. With ad-blocker, as expected, we find
that the original ad is not available. PageFair includes a
replacement ad, which is not hosted on Google’s domain.
Instead, the replacement ad is hosted on PageFair’s domain
— adsfeed.pagefair.com. We found that PageFair’s domain
is whitelisted by EasyList [4], which is a default list on pop-
ular ad-blockers. The following snippet is from EasyList [4]:
"##.pagefair-acceptable"
"||pagefair.net^$third-party"
The rule clearly indicates that PageFair is allowed to show
acceptable ads on partner websites. PageFair’s response is
reflective of the growing adoption of acceptable ads by many
publishers and ad-blockers [33].
It is worth mentioning that when we rechecked some web-
sites several weeks after we finished the initial experiments,
the behaviors of websites changed. For instance, http://
www.vipleague.tv used to detect ad-blockers and simply refuse
1 // accessible resources of ad-blocking extensions
2 var c = {
3 // chrome internal ext domain :// folder name of
each extension/ subfolder and name of
resource
4 adblock: "chrome -extension ://
gighmmpiobklfepjocnamgkkbiglidom/img/icon24.
png",
5 adblock_plus: "chrome -extension ://
cfhdojbkjhnklbpkdaibdccddilifddb/block.html"
,
6 adblock_pro: "chrome -extension ://
ocifcklkibdehekfnmflempfgjhbedch/components/
block/block.html",
7 adblock_premium: "chrome -extension ://
fndlhnanhedoklpdaacidomdnplcjcpj/img/icon24.
png",
8 adblock_super: "chrome -extension ://
knebimhcckndhiglamoabbnifdkijidd/widgets/
block/block.html",
9 adguard: "chrome -extension ://
bgnkhhnnamicmpeenaelnjfhikgbkllg/elemhidehit
.png",
10 adremover: "chrome -extension ://
mcefmojpghnaceadnghednjhbmphipkb/img/icon24.
png",
11 ublock: "chrome -extension ://
epcnnfbjfcgphgdmggkamkmgojdagdnn/document -
blocked.html"
12 }
Figure 12: PageFair accesses extension resources to
detect ad-blockers.
to serve users via a large pop-up window. It is correctly clas-
sified as the common family. However, in its recent version,
it has evolved to behave similarly to PageFair. Instead of re-
fusing the service, the website switches the origin of the ads
from adsrvmedia, which is on the filter list of ad-blockers,
to the same local domain. Since the new ad URL is not on
the filter list, the ad-blocker simply fails to block it. This
shows yet another new response that is similar in nature to
PageFair.
5. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first
large-scale measurement study of ad-block detection. Since
the arms race between publishers and ad-blockers is a recent
phenomenon, prior work has mainly focused on understand-
ing the dynamics of ads and ad-blockers. Below, we discuss
prior literature on online advertising and ad-blockers.
Online Advertising. A large number of web publishers
rely on online advertising. However, online advertising has
recently become more intrusive and annoying to end-uses.
Researchers have recently focused on various security and
privacy aspects of online advertising. Li et al. conducted
the first large-scale study of malicious advertising (called
malvertising) on the web [26]. Their analysis of 90,000 web-
sites showed that not only malicious ads effect top websites
but they also evade detection by various cloaking techniques.
Zarras et. al. also conducted a large-scale study to deter-
mine the extent at which user are exposed to malicious ad-
vertisements [34]. Their measurement study of more then
60,000 ads showed that around 1% ads exhibit malicious be-
havior. They also showed that a few ad networks are more
prone to supply malicious advertisements than others.
Other than malvertising, researchers have also analyzed
privacy implications of online advertising. Online advertis-
ing relies on sophisticated tracking of users across the web
to target personalized ads. Roesner et al. conducted a com-
prehensive active measurement study of third-party tracking
on the web [31]. They found more than 500 unique track-
ers on 1000 websites, with a few web trackers covering a
large fraction of users’ browsing activity. Metwalley et al.
conducted a passive measurement study to determine the ex-
tent of tracking on the web. They found that more than 400
tracking services are contacted by the users and also 80% of
the users are tracked by at least one tracking service within
a second after starting their surfing sessions [27]. Nath per-
formed a measurement of 500K ad requests from 150K An-
droid apps [29]. The analysis showed that although most ad
networks collect targeting data on mobile apps, it does not
significantly alter the way ads are chosen for many users.
Ad-blockers. Due to the rapid increase in the use of ad-
blockers, researchers are interested in measuring the use of
ad-blockers. Pujol et al. conducted a measurement study
using passive network traces of thousands of users from a
European ISP to quantify ad-block usage [30]. Their results
show that 22% of users use AdBlock Plus. They also found
that ad-blocker users still generate significant ad traffic due
their enrollment in the acceptable ads program. Walls et
al. conducted a study of the whitelists used by ad-blockers
for allowing acceptable ads [33]. They analyzed the evolu-
tion of ad-blocker whitelists and performed measurements
on 8K websites. Their analysis showed that whitelists con-
tains around 5,936 filters and 3,545 unique publisher do-
mains. Their findings highlight that whitelists are inclined
towards top ranked Alexa websites (59% filters are for top
5000 websites). Gugelmann et al. proposed a methodology
to compliment manual filter lists of ad-blockers by automat-
ically blacklisting intrusive ads [22]. They train a classifier
on HTTP traffic statistics and identify around 200 new ad-
vertising and tracking services.
Since ad-block detection is a recent phenomenon, to the
best of our knowledge, no prior work has studied the mecha-
nisms used by ad-block detectors. Our work aims to fill this
gap by conducting a large-scale measurement of ad-block
detection on the web.
6. CONCLUSION
We present the first large-scale study of ad-block detec-
tion on the web. Our main observation is that about 1100
websites in the Alexa top-100K are currently performing ad-
block detection. Out of these, about 300 websites respond to
ad-block detection by requesting users to disable ad-blockers
through notifications to more aggressive blocking of website
content. We also find the increasing use of third party ad-
block detectors such as PageFair. We envision the arms
race to continue in the coming years as we expect both ad-
blockers and ad-block detectors to adapt in the future.
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